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INTRODUCTION** 
Few exercises in constitutional interpretation forge such 
fundamental divisions between individuals as does the effort to define 
the meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  The 
ramifications of this inherent divisiveness are plainly illustrated by the 
jurisprudential quagmire spawned by the Supreme Court’s attempts to 
apply the clause to the many distinct scenarios that arise under it.  A 
cursory glance at the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the 
Establishment Clause is sufficient to reveal a number of sharply divided 
opinions with justices asserting vigorous arguments interpreting the 
meaning of the clause in various contexts.  Unfortunately, these strong 
divisions produced jurisprudence wrought with confusion and 
ambiguity.1  Despite decades of decisions, attempts at predicting 
outcomes are often futile and the landscape of the law in the area is 
perpetually changing.  Even the fundamental principles of the Court’s 
analysis are prone to precipitous change.  While early Supreme Court 
precedent focused on an “effects” oriented approach to deciding 
Establishment Clause issues, the Court’s recent decisions illustrate a 
rather abrupt, but not an altogether unforeshadowed, shift toward a 
principle of formal neutrality, at least in certain cases.2 
Indisputably, the modern Court has strayed from strict reliance 
upon the effect-heavy elements of the much-studied and much-maligned 
Lemon test3 to inquiries centered more upon the formal neutrality of 
government action that allegedly violates the Establishment Clause.4  
 
** As an initial matter, I must acknowledge that I owe credit to Professor James J. Kelly of the 
Notre Dame Law School for the idea which spawned this Note.  Professor Kelly’s blog posting 
brought the underlying case to my attention and also offered interesting questions posed by the 
District Court’s decision which I hope to help answer herein.  James J. Kelly, City of South Bend 
Enjoined by U.S. District Court from Transferring Land to Catholic HS, Land Use Prof Blog 
(September 8, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2011/09/city-of-south-bend-
enjoined-by-us-district-court-from-transferring-land-to-catholic-hs.html. 
 1.  See Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 728 (2006) (noting that, over the course of a decade, various Justices 
articulated ten different Establishment Clause standards). 
 2.  See FRANK S. RAVITCH, LAW AND RELIGION, A READER: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND 
THEORY 327-328 (Thomson West 2008).  As discussed later in this Note, Ravitch illustrates that the 
Supreme Court laid the groundwork for a doctrinal shift toward formal neutrality in a series of cases 
regarding the constitutionality of government aid to religious institutions.   
 3.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  For a description of the “Lemon Test” see 
infra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 4.   See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a formally 
2
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Yet, precedent reveals that no single test is applicable in every context, 
and perhaps the Lemon test, as originally formulated, retains some 
amount of viability in certain Establishment Clause disputes.5  What is 
clear, however, is that the collective net cast by the totality of the 
Court’s decisions is still not broad enough to comfortably accommodate 
all government actions which entail Establishment Clause implications.  
As a product of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential shortcomings, the 
Nation’s lower courts and those who practice within them suffer from a 
lack of clarity and guidance, especially in hard cases. 
A recent decision by an Indiana District Court enjoining the City of 
South Bend from transferring land to a Catholic high school as part of an 
economic development plan highlights the failure of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence to provide clear standards.6  Relying largely on a 
suspect Lemon analysis, the court in Wirtz v. City of South Bend7 ruled 
that the intended transfer violated the Establishment Clause because it 
would send a message to the community that the government endorsed 
the religious doctrine of the high school.8  Furthermore, the court found 
that the ad hoc nature of the transfer sufficiently distinguished the case 
from the religiously neutral programs upheld in the Supreme Court’s 
recent cases that exhibit a burgeoning reliance upon a principle of formal 
neutrality.9 
The Wirtz court’s opinion begs the question of whether the 
Establishment Clause effectively prevents religious institutions from 
enjoying the benefits of below-market economic development land 
transfers.  Surprisingly, this inquiry has never been squarely addressed 
by a federal court, rendering the decision in Wirtz more influential than 
it otherwise might have been.  In Wirtz, the Northern District of Indiana 
ostensibly answers the question posed in the affirmative.  Public land 
transfers to private organizations are necessarily ad hoc in nature, 
inevitably bestow some benefit upon the private organization, and 
 
neutral aid program that had the effect of bestowing substantial benefits upon religious institutions); 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding the use of tax revenues to reimburse parents for 
various school costs regardless of whether their children attended a public school or private 
religious institution). 
 5.  However, one commentator suggests that “effects” no longer matter, at least when 
indirect aid is at issue, and that the only inquiries to be made under Lemon and Zelman are whether 
an aid program is facially neutral and whether public money flows through a private “circuit 
breaker.”  Such a reading of the Court’s decisions essentially eviscerates what was left of Lemon in 
the government aid context.  See RAVITCH, supra note 2, at 383.   
 6.  Wirtz v. City of S. Bend, Ind., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 7.  813 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 8.  Id. at 1069.  
 9.  Id. at 1062.  
3
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frequently occur at below-market levels, especially in an environment 
where a city is prone to give incentives to private entities in a proactive 
effort to revive a floundering economy.  As such, it is difficult to 
envision a transfer that would survive the District Court’s analysis in 
Wirtz. 
However, the Wirtz court, perhaps justifiably given the state of the 
doctrine, made several significant legal errors on the way to its ultimate 
conclusion.  First, the court erred by relying heavily on an 
“endorsement” approach to reach its decision.  The history of the 
endorsement test reveals that it performs well in some cases but fails to 
provide an adequate standard in others.10  Second and more importantly, 
the court, in finding South Bend’s perceived endorsement of a religious 
institution to be dispositive, failed to adequately consider the nature of 
South Bend’s economic development plan and the Supreme Court’s 
recent move toward a formal neutrality approach in its Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.  Indeed, in light of considerable doubt surrounding 
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause precedent and particularly 
the applicability of the endorsement analysis to various situations, the 
District Court should not have relied on the endorsement test to reach its 
decision.  Moreover, the court’s endorsement analysis makes way for 
unfavorable policy outcomes in future cases.  Formalistic adherence to 
the endorsement formulation of Lemon’s second prong in the context of 
economic development land transfers effectively precludes such 
transfers from taking place at all.  This result is neither necessary nor 
desirable.  For these reasons, a new standard is needed to evaluate 
economic development transfers to religious institutions, and this Note 
offers such a standard for consideration. 
Part I of this Note explores the contours of the complicated history 
of the Establishment Clause by examining the creation of the Lemon test 
and the inconsistencies of the test’s subsequent application.  The Note 
then explores Justice O’Connor’s endorsement modification to that test.  
Part I concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s move toward 
embracing a principle formal neutrality.  Part II provides a factual 
history of the transfer at issue and a detailed summary of the District 
Court’s opinion in Wirtz.  Part III of the Note explains that the 
Constitution does not preclude economic development transfers to 
religious institutions.  Part III also provides reasoning for why the 
endorsement test is patently insufficient to evaluate the constitutionality 
 
 10.  Id. at 1068 (finding that the transfer would have the effect of leading the “objective well-
informed, reasonable observer to think the City is endorsing St. Joseph’s High School . . .”). 
4
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of such transfers and offers a standard based on a principle of formal 
neutrality better able to guide future courts confronted with similar 
issues.  Lastly, Part IV adds a brief conclusion to this Note. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Modern Establishment Clause and Lemon 
The Constitution instructs, “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion . . . .”11  This language spawned what is 
colloquially known as the “Establishment Clause,” a divisive and 
frequently contested portion of the law which guides the Nation.  
Unfortunately, the disputes arising under the clause concerning whether 
and when government went too far in establishing a religion produced a 
Supreme Court jurisprudence that, since its inception, failed to offer 
clear answers to important questions or substantial guidance to the lower 
courts and legislatures. 
In 1947, the Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause 
into the 14th Amendment, thus applying it to the states.12  In Everson v. 
Board of Education,13 the decision which accomplished incorporation, 
the Supreme Court, largely rejecting a prior jurisprudence of 
accommodation, pushed Establishment Clause doctrine toward a focus 
on neutrality and a stronger emphasis on the separation between church 
and state.14  Noting the broad interpretation afforded to the 
Establishment Clause, the Everson court stated that, at the very least, the 
constitutional prohibition on government establishment of a religion 
means: 
[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another.  Neither can force nor influence a 
person to go to or to remain away from church . . . or force him to 
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion . . . .15 
 
 11.  U.S. Const. amend. I. 
 12.  Ann E. Stockman, ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education: The Black 
Sheep of Graduation Prayer Cases, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1805, 1811 (1999).  
 13.   Everson v. Bd. of Educ. Of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 14.   See Stockman, supra note 12, at 1811; see also William P. Marshall, “We Know It When 
We See It” The Supreme Court Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495 (1986) (stating that 
since Everson, “it has been painfully clear that logical consistency and establishment clause 
jurisprudence were to have little in common and characterizing the whole of Establishment Clause 
doctrine as ‘legendary for its inconsistencies’”). 
 15.  Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. 
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Despite this attempt at articulating the meaning of the clause, 
commentators reflecting on Everson frequently offer harsh criticism of 
the jurisprudence that followed, with a specific emphasis on the 
decision’s failure to offer a definitive test with which to approach 
Establishment Clause issues.16 
Following Everson, the Supreme Court decided disputes under the 
Establishment Clause by employing a rather simple analysis that asked: 
(1) whether the contested government action had a religious purpose, 
and (2) whether such action had a religious effect.17  In 1971, however, 
the Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman18 and crafted a comprehensive test 
for adjudicating alleged Establishment Clause violations.19  In 
establishing the Lemon test, the Court synthesized its past precedent into 
a tripartite standard.  The test states that in order to fall short of violating 
the Establishment Clause, the contested governmental action must: (1) 
have a secular purpose; (2) have a principal or primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion, and; (3) not foster excessive government 
entanglement with religion.20 
On its face, the Lemon test appears to offer that which Everson was 
lacking—a workable standard with an inherent flexibility that would 
prove useful going forward.  Yet, the test produced quite the opposite 
outcome, and Supreme Court precedent varies wildly in articulating the 
exact role that Lemon plays in resolving Establishment Clause 
disputes.21  Charting the course of the Lemon test’s application, author 
William Marshall notes that in certain instances, the Court has asserted 
that the test must be strictly applied.22  In others, the Court refers to the 
 
 16.  See Stockman, supra note 12, at 1812.  The Court’s failure, Stockman argues, led to a 
series of ad hoc analyses determined largely by the facts of any given case.  Ultimately these 
analyses prevented the court from offering any simple unifying principles and plunged 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence into a realm of uncertainty thus leaving judges and legislatures 
to play a guessing game.  
 17.   Frank J. Ducoat, Note, Inconsistent Guideposts: Van Orden, McCreary County, and the 
Continuing Need for a Single and Predictable Establishment Clause Test, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & 
RELIGION 14, *3 (2007).  Similarly to other commentators, Ducoat proceeds to criticize the 
Supreme Court’s inability to present a unifying Establishment Clause principle and to characterize 
the Court’s post-Lemon jurisprudence as reaching results that are both inconsistent and bizarre.  Id. 
at *4. 
 18.  403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 19.   Id. at 612-13.  
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See Marshall, supra note 14, at 497.  The Supreme Court’s ambiguous treatment of the 
Lemon test, Marshall argues, created “a patchwork of ad hoc decisions inside a legal framework 
that . . . lost its intellectual integrity.”  Id. at 498. 
 22.  See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (stating that a statute in violation 
of any of Lemon’s principles must necessarily be struck down); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious 
6
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Lemon test as offering mere guideposts for courts to follow.23  In still 
other circumstances, the Court decided Establishment Clause cases 
absent a Lemon analysis, bringing into question the test’s continued 
validity.24 
Realizing the problems stemming from the Court’s treatment of 
Lemon, the Justices have not shied away from offering criticism of their 
own.  The eminently quotable Justice Antonin Scalia, expressing his 
dismay at the Lemon test’s persistence, once commented: “Like some 
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and 
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks 
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little 
children and . . . attorneys.”25  In less colorful terms, the Court has 
criticized its jurisprudence by characterizing the Lemon test as 
sacrificing “clarity and predictability for flexibility.”26 
Although much-maligned, the Lemon test’s temporary 
disappearance from Supreme Court precedent in more recent years failed 
to produce noticeably more consistent results.  Surveying cases 
following the test’s apparent abandonment in Lee v. Weisman,27 
commentator Ann E. Stockman noted that none of the various other tests 
proffered by the Justices could garner a majority.  As a result, 
inconsistencies again littered Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  
Stockman stated such inconsistencies were apparent in decisions which: 
[U]pheld the entrance of public employees into private schools for the 
first time, struck down a separate school district made up solely of 
members of a culturally distinct religious sect, and approved the use of 
public space for religious messages on the same access policies of 
those allowed to use the space for non-religious messages.28 
Perhaps in implicit acknowledgment of the Court’s failure to adopt a 
 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
 23.  Sch. Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985). 
 24.  See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).  In Marsh, the Court illustrated a tradition 
of opening legislative sessions with prayer spanning the entirety of the Nation’s history and then 
relied heavily upon that tradition to dismiss an Establishment Clause challenge to such a practice in 
the Nebraska legislature; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(praising what Justice Scalia perceived as an “otherwise lamentable” decision for forsaking the 
Lemon analysis and stating, “The Court today demonstrates the irrelevance of Lemon by essentially 
ignoring it . . . .”). 
 25.  Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
 26.  Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). 
 27.  505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992). 
 28.  See Stockman, supra note 12, at 1818. 
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new standard, the Lemon test returned after Weisman but remains 
floundering in uncertainty.29 
Despite the unsettled nature of the Lemon test, it remains a crucial 
facet of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and many modern analyses 
necessarily begin with a discussion of its three-prong test.  As a result, 
the inconsistency that pervades the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has 
been handed down to the nation’s circuit and district courts, who 
ultimately bear the burden of the division of the Justices.  The test has 
not remained static, however, and the Court has offered important 
substantive changes to its analysis.  As will be argued in an analysis of 
the decision in Wirtz, however, these changes, perhaps understandably, 
are often overlooked or overemphasized by the lower courts.  The most 
relevant of these doctrinal changes are explored in the subsequent 
sections. 
B. The Evolution of Lemon and O’Connor’s Endorsement Test 
The Establishment Clause is implicated in an extremely broad 
range of government actions.  The complexity of the varied issues 
presented to the Supreme Court for adjudication, rather than solely the 
waffling positions of the Justices, can be counted as a cause of the 
ambiguity and inconsistency that plagues the doctrine.  Indeed, the 
nature of the range of issues the Establishment Clause covers likely 
accounts for the flexibility incorporated into the Lemon analysis.  Due to 
this inherent complexity, the Court has, over time, developed nuanced 
approaches to the separate issues that fall within the ambit of the 
Establishment Clause.30  As such, there is a danger that inheres to a 
lower court’s strict, formalistic reliance upon any one particular 
approach, especially when it applies that approach to factual scenarios 
that fall outside of its breadth.  By adhering to any single approach to 
decide all disputes, a lower court risks applying a standard, which may 
be perfectly adequate to decide one type of Establishment Clause issue, 
to an issue for which the standard is wholly unsuited.  This issue is 
discussed further in relationship to the Wirtz decision below.  For present 
 
 29.  Indeed, the Lemon test appears in even the most recent of Establishment Clause 
decisions.  See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (criticizing the lower court’s application of 
the effects prong of the Lemon test and remanding for proper consideration). 
 30.  Establishment Clause doctrine can be broken down and organized into several distinct 
parts.  Among these are cases which involve organized religious exercises in public schools, 
organized religious exercises outside of public schools, the teaching of religious concepts in public 
schools, public displays of religious symbols by both privates and state actors, and government aid 
to religious institutions and religion itself.  See generally RAVITCH, supra note 2. 
8
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purposes, however, a discussion of the “endorsement test,” one of the 
most significant additions to Lemon, is in order. 
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Donnelly,31 an 
Establishment Clause case involving the public display of a Nativity 
scene.  The facts of this case are surprisingly simple.  Each year, the city 
of Pawtucket, Rhode Island erected a Christmas display in a park owned 
by a nonprofit organization in the city’s shopping district.32  The 
Nativity scene at issue constituted a facet of a larger compilation that 
included secular messages such as “Seasons Greetings” and symbols 
such as Christmas trees and a Santa Claus house.33  Certain Pawtucket 
citizens and individual members of the American Civil Liberties Union 
challenged the inclusion of the Nativity scene in the display, alleging an 
Establishment Clause violation.34  Chief Justice Burger focused on the 
secular purpose of the display as a whole, and through his application of 
the Lemon test, concluded that the city had not violated the 
Establishment Clause.35  This opinion garnered the support of a plurality 
of Court. 
Lynch, however, finds its historical significance in the concurring 
opinion of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.  Satisfied with the ultimate 
result but believing Lemon’s standard to be in need of refinement, 
Justice O’Connor proposed what is now commonly known as the 
“endorsement test.”36  Justice O’Connor stated that the dispositive issue 
in Lynch was whether Pawtucket endorsed Christianity by including the 
Nativity scene in its Christmas display and such a determination, she 
argued, necessarily required an inquiry into the objective and subjective 
components of the display.37  Subjectively, Justice O’Connor asserted, a 
court must ask what message the government intended to convey.38  
Objectively, a court must consider what message the government’s 
action actually conveyed.39  In proposing the standard, Justice O’Connor 
stated, “The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government’s 
actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of 
 
 31.  465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 32.  Id. at 668.   
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 671. 
 35.  Id. at 685.  Chief Justice Burger succinctly summarized the plurality’s holding by stating, 
“We are satisfied that the City has a secular purpose for including the crèche, that the City has not 
impermissibly advanced religion, and that including the crèche does not create excessive 
entanglement between religion and government.” Id. 
 36.  Id. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
9
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endorsement or disapproval.”40  According to Justice O’Connor, the 
principal problem with government endorsement of religion is that it 
“sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to 
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”41 
Following its creation in Lynch, the endorsement test appeared in 
several of Justice O’Connor’s concurring and dissenting opinions.  The 
contexts in which she employed the standard include challenges to 
prayer in public schools, government religious displays, private religious 
displays on public property, and the Pledge of Allegiance.42  In these 
subsequent cases, Justice O’Connor also elaborated on and clarified her 
endorsement analysis by asserting that the relevant inquiry should hinge 
upon “whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, 
legislative history, and implementation of the [contested action], would 
perceive it as a state endorsement of [religion].”43  Despite the harshness 
of the criticism of the Court’s establishment doctrine in general, the 
endorsement test enjoyed a reasonably favorable reception by 
commentators.44  Though never adopted as the definitive test or even the 
 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at  688.  As discussed below, it was precisely this language that the District Court in 
Wirtz relied upon in deciding to enjoin the City of South Bend’s intended transfer. 
 42.  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding that a 
state statute authorizing a daily period of silence in public schools for meditation or voluntary 
prayer had the impermissible effect of endorsing religion); Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union,  492 U.S. 573, 627, 632 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (stating that the placement of a Nativity scene in the lobby of the county courthouse conveyed 
a message of government endorsement of Christianity but that a holiday display of a menorah, a 
Christmas tree, and a sign saluting liberty did not); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. 
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 782 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that a state’s tolerance of a 
display of crosses erected by the Ku Klux Klan on public property would not lead the reasonable 
observer to conclude that the state endorsed religion); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 44-45 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that the phrase “under God” as contained 
in the Pledge of Allegiance is merely a ceremonial reference and does not amount to endorsement of 
religion). 
 43.  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76. 
 44.  See, e.g., Gey, supra note 1, at 738 (asserting that “[the endorsement test’s] statements of 
separationist principle nicely encapsulate the structural function of the Establishment Clause, which 
is designed to divorce political participation from religion.  The prohibition of establishment puts 
everyone on an equal political footing, regardless of their idiosyncratic religious beliefs or lack of 
belief . . . Justice O’Connor’s explanation of her endorsement analysis provided a rare articulation 
of this structural reality.”); see also, David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model 
of the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 584 (2002) (praising the endorsement test for 
avoiding formalism and for paying attention to the effects of various government programs); see 
generally Marshall, supra note 14. 
Of course, the endorsement test suffers many detractors who claim that the test is no panacea for the 
10
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most important facet of a Lemon analysis, the endorsement test was also, 
on occasion, well-received by Supreme Court majority opinions.45 
It is clear, however, that the endorsement test is not applied in every 
Establishment Clause case, and the test’s absence speaks to its patent 
inapplicability to some Establishment Clause issues.  Perhaps most 
telling of this assertion are the instances where even Justice O’Connor 
did not resort to an endorsement analysis46 or instances in which 
O’Connor expressed doubt in continuing to use the Lemon analysis at 
all.47  Judging by a reading of her opinions, Justice O’Connor would 
agree that applying her endorsement test is simply futile in certain 
scenarios.  Indeed, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School 
District v. Grumet,48 Justice O’Connor warned against continuing the 
search for a “Grand Unified Theory” with which to approach 
Establishment issues and further stated that the Court runs the danger of 
doing more harm than good by “shoehorning new problems into a test 
that does not reflect the special concerns raised by those problems.”49 
What is also clear, however, is that Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement test endures as being particularly useful in deciding 
disputes arising in the contexts in which the test has traditionally been 
applied—that is, cases involving religious symbols or government 
speech.50  In these types of cases, particularly those considering the 
 
many ills of Lemon.  See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: 
Establishment Neutrality and the ‘No Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 268 (1987) 
(asserting, “If the ‘no endorsement’ test ultimately offers cause for hope . . . the hope is that the 
test’s deficiencies, once perceived, will prompt jurists and scholars to leave behind what has proven 
to be a doctrinal dead end and turn their attention to exploring more promising avenues that may 
lead toward an adequate establishment doctrine”); see also, Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward a 
Resressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, at 584 (after first praising the test, Cole notes that it 
has not be an unmitigated success because it “provides few clear guidelines, and appears to turn on 
judges’ inevitably subjective assessments of a hypothetical reasonable observer’s perceptions about 
the cultural significance of state practices.”). 
 45.  See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (citing O’Connor’s Lynch 
concurrence for the proposition that “the purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether 
government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion”). 
 46.  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding as constitutional an Ohio 
school voucher program that had the effect of largely benefiting sectarian schools, a decision with 
which Justice O’Connor concurred). 
 47.  Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)  (characterizing the Lemon test as too vague to be useful and arguing for 
the creation of several narrow tests to be applied in various areas). 
 48.  512 U.S. 687 (1994) 
 49.  Id. at 718.  Furthermore, O’Connor’s concurrence illustrates her belief that neutrality, 
above all other principles, should guide government decisions regarding religion.  As such, 
O’Connor implored the Supreme Court to turn away from its increasing animosity toward religion.  
Id. at 717-719.  
 50.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
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constitutionality of the public display of religious symbols, the 
endorsement test is alive and well.51  Given the endorsement test’s 
limited applicability, however, the Supreme Court has often turned to 
other means of deciding some Establishment Clause disputes.  
Specifically, the Court’s modern focus centers on principles of formal 
neutrality. 
C. The Supreme Court Moves toward Formal Neutrality in Aid Cases 
As this Note now moves to discuss the Supreme Court’s recent 
jurisprudence of formal neutrality, it is worth mentioning for clarity’s 
sake that Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test itself is rooted in 
neutrality, at least in one sense of the term.  Indeed, the key focus of the 
endorsement test is to ensure that the government appears to be acting 
absent any intent to endorse a religion at the expense of alienating 
nonadherents.  Stated another way, it is absolutely crucial to the 
endorsement analysis that the contested government action appears to be 
neutral.52  In contrast, the doctrine of formal neutrality is concerned with 
whether the government acted absent a motivation to promote or burden 
religion without regard to the perceptions of the reasonable observer.  
Philip Kurland classically defined this principle in the following manner: 
The [free exercise and establishment] clauses should be read as stating 
a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard 
for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as they 
should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a 
benefit or to impose a burden.53 
 
 51.  See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010) (criticizing the lower court’s 
application of the effects prong of the Lemon test and remanding for proper consideration); Am. 
Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that memorial crosses placed 
by the government along Utah highways endorsed Christianity); Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1989) (displaying a cross in a central location in a government 
building on Easter was the prototypical example of a display conveying the message of government 
endorsement of Christianity); Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding an eight-
foot cross designed to be a war memorial located on government owned land violated the 
Establishment Clause); Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that a war memorial containing a large white cross primarily conveyed a message of government 
endorsement of religion that violated the Establishment Clause). 
 52.  Professor Steven Smith refers to this principle as “symbolic neutrality.”  Smith asserts 
that the key question asked by the endorsement test is not whether government acted with the intent 
to aid religion, rather, the test boils down to an inquiry of whether “government has attempted to 
depart from . . . an appearance . . . of neutrality.” See Smith, supra note 44, at 319. 
 53.  DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS & HISTORY 11 (Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2010) (quoting Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme 
Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961)). 
12
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As briefly mentioned in the preceding section, the Supreme Court 
necessarily decides the multifarious Establishment Clause issues with 
varied approaches.54  Among these approaches is formal neutrality as 
defined above.  This approach has become increasingly prevalent in the 
line of cases where the Court explores the constitutionality of 
government aid that benefits religious institutions.  Of course, “aid” may 
be broadly defined to encompass the whole of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, but for purposes of the following discussion, “aid” should 
be construed as financial and other beneficial support provided to a 
religious institution by the government or a governmental entity.  
Traditionally, the term “aid,” as used here, would implicate those cases 
involving government grants, subsidies, tax exemptions, and other types 
of general funding.55  As explained below, the doctrine in this area of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has undergone considerable 
changes, and the Court’s modern approach of formal neutrality permits 
government aid to religious institutions, at least when that aid ostensibly 
flows through the filter of a private decision-maker. 
Formal neutrality did not always dominate the Court’s decisions in 
government aid cases.  Shortly after the creation of the Lemon test, the 
Court relied upon a separationist approach when deciding cases in which 
government aid benefited schools with a religious affiliation.56  In Meek 
v. Pittenger,57 for example, the Court ruled a program that promoted the 
mere lending of instructional materials to religious schools 
unconstitutional.58  Indeed, even a cursory review of the Court’s 
 
Laycock did not personally subscribe to Kurland’s formulation of neutrality.  Instead, Laycock 
advocated for a form of neutrality he described as “substantive.”  Douglas Laycock, Formal, 
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990).  
Laycock defined substantive neutrality to mean that the Establishment Clause requires government 
“to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages belief or disbelief, practice or 
nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.”  Id. at 1001.  At its most basic level, “substantive 
neutrality” means that “religion is to be left as wholly to private choice as anything can be.”  Id. at 
1002.  This formulation of neutrality, or at least variations of it, has garnered some favor among 
commentators in the field.  See, e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to 
Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 504-
505 (2004).  However, a complete discussion of the nuances of the many distinct formulations of 
neutrality offered by several commentators is beyond the scope of the present Note. 
 54.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 55.  See RAVITCH, supra note 2, at 309 (defining “aid” in the same manner as it is defined in 
the present Note).  
 56.  See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) 
(striking down three programs under the “effects” prong of the Lemon test because the aid indirectly 
received by sectarian schools could be easily diverted to support the religious aspects of a sectarian 
school even if such a result was not mandated).   
 57.  421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
 58.  Id. at 371-371. 
13
Doringo: Revival Toward a Formal Neutrality
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
VOL. 46, NO. 3 - ARTICLE 5 - DORINGO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2013  2:59 PM 
776 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:763 
decision in Meek and other cases in the years following Lemon reveals a 
majority of Justices consistently wary of the possible constitutional 
problems stemming from a religious institution’s use of government aid, 
no matter if that aid was indirect or not.59  Highlighting such wariness, in 
Aguilar v. Felton, decided in 1985 and later overruled by a case 
discussed below, the Court struck down a section of a federal statute that 
required federally funded remedial education teachers to offer 
instruction to certain students regardless of whether that student was 
enrolled at a public institution or at a private religious school.60 
It is important to note that although the flexibility of the Lemon test 
and the strength of some early Establishment Clause precedent61 
afforded the Supreme Court the ability to erect a “wall of separation” in 
the aid cases mentioned above, the Establishment Clause does not 
strictly necessitate that outcome.  On the opposite end of the requirement 
to ensure some divide between the state and religion, it would be 
similarly impermissible and unfair to cut off religious institutions from 
all forms of public benefit under all circumstances, and the Supreme 
Court expressly cautioned against such an approach.62  Thus, the Court 
has long recognized that government policies with legitimate secular 
objectives are not objectionable merely because they incidentally benefit 
religion.63  Furthermore, commentators note that there is no controversy 
surrounding many of the avenues through which a religious institution 
may enjoy public benefits, such as tax subsidies received through non-
profit tax exemptions, individual deductions taken by members of 
religious institutions, and more general public benefits such as police 
 
 59.  Id.; see also, supra note 56 and accompanying text considering Nyquist; Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (striking down programs that loaned educational materials directly to 
students attending religious institutions because the schools incidentally enjoyed the benefit of the 
equipment). 
 60.  Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 
(1997).  Specifically, the Court found that this program resulted in a violation of Lemon’s 
“entanglement” prong due to the fact that the aid was often given to these students on school 
premises in pervasively sectarian institutions and would therefore require consistent government 
inspection to ensure that the teachers were not injecting their instruction with a religious message.  
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 411-413. 
 61.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ. Of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (asserting that the 
Establishment Clause was intended to erect a wall of separation between Church and State).   
 62.   The Everson Court, despite its “wall of separation” language, also argued that the state 
could not penalize religions by handicapping them.  Id. at 18.  
 63.  See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (stating, “The 
nonsectarian aims of government and the interests of religious groups often overlap, and this Court 
has never required that public authorities refrain from implementing reasonable measures to 
advance legitimate secular goals merely because they would thereby relieve religious groups of 
costs they would otherwise incur.”). 
14
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protection.64 
Given the malleability of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and 
the availability of public benefits to religious institutions generally, it 
should come as no surprise to find the sway of the Supreme Court 
edging ever closer to a jurisprudence grounded in principles of formal 
neutrality.  Quite clearly, the last few decades have whittled away at the 
strong separationist principles guiding the Court of old. 
Beginning in the mid-1980s and into the 1990s, the Court exhibited 
through a series of decisions a greater willingness to defer to the 
legislature when it came to programs which made government funds 
available to private individuals despite the fact that the funds given to 
such individuals may find their way to benefiting religious institutions.65  
In these cases, however, the Court retained a focus upon the practical 
effects of the contested programs under Lemon’s second prong.66  So, 
while deferring largely to the facial neutrality of programs in many 
cases, the Court remained unwilling to completely depart from the 
Lemon analysis.67 
Agostini v. Felton,68 a seminal decision in the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, set the Supreme Court on its path 
away from Lemon and toward a true formal neutrality approach in aid 
cases.  The dispute in Agostini arose from the same program that gave 
rise to the challenge above in Aguilar, which concerned the 
constitutionality of a government program that provided on-site 
instruction by federally funded teachers to children attending religious 
institutions.  The practical effect of the Court’s decision to strike down 
the program in Aguilar was to force off-site teaching of the students who 
benefited from the courses, thereby substantially increasing costs while 
simultaneously decreasing the efficiency of providing instruction.69  
 
 64.  See Cole, supra note 44, at 580. 
 65.   Illustrating this jurisprudential shift, one commentator points out that Mueller v. Allen, 
463 U.S. 388 (1983), Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), and 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) collectively stand for the proposition that 
“it is constitutional for government to make aid available to individuals without regard to whether 
they use that aid at secular or religious schools . . . .”  RAVITCH, supra note 2, at 323. 
 66.  See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12. 
 67.  See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (engaging in a complete Lemon analysis to 
consider the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act, which awarded grants to public 
agencies as well as private religious organizations that provided services relating to teen 
pregnancy). 
 68.  Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 69.  In an effort to keep public employees from being physically present on school grounds, 
instruction to students of religious schools who participated in the program was conducted in vans 
converted into classrooms.  The instruction also occurred via computer-aided instruction on campus.  
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Citing these burdens and the changes in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence since the Court decided Aguilar, the proponents of the 
program appealed the permanent injunction preventing public employees 
from teaching in religious schools.70  The Agostini Court, in an opinion 
delivered by Justice O’Connor, overruled the decision to strike down the 
program in Aguilar.71 
The importance of Agostini is not merely that it overruled 
precedent, but also that it brought considerable modifications to the 
Lemon analysis in aid cases.  Specifically, the third prong of the Lemon 
test was subsumed into the second prong, and the Court changed the 
effects analysis.72  This change came through the Court’s distillation of 
the effects prong into three elements considering whether the aid: (1) 
resulted in a governmental incentive to undertake religious 
indoctrination; (2) defined its recipients by reference to religion; and (3) 
created excessive government entanglement with religion.73  Given that 
it is difficult to imagine a facially neutral program that would violate the 
first and second elements of the test, the Agostini modification to Lemon 
illustrates a Court in the process of taking substantial strides toward an 
approach with formal neutrality at its core. 
D. Formal Neutrality Embraced in Zelman 
As could be expected after Agostini, the modern approach to 
Establishment Clause cases involving government aid hinges almost 
entirely upon whether the contested program from which the aid is 
dispensed is formally neutral.74  When a program satisfies facial 
neutrality, the Court has been remarkably willing to set aside the 
considerations that guided former opinions, and the Court’s recent 
decisions in the aid context have gone further than ever before in 
dispensing with effects-laden inquiry under Lemon. 
 
These modifications increased the cost of running the program considerably.  Agostini, 521 U.S. at 
213. 
 70.  Id. at 214.   
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 222-25. 
 73.  Id. at 234-35. 
 74.  Though the trend toward formal neutrality is unmistakable, the Court has not been 
entirely consistent in its application of formal neutrality principles.  At times, the Court has deferred 
largely to the will of the state legislature regarding certain aid programs, even if facets of that 
program relied on strict separationist principles.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) 
(upholding a state statute that denied state scholarship funds to a student who wanted to pursue a 
degree in theology at a Christian institution).  
16
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The decision in Mitchell v. Helms,75 for example, illustrates the sea 
of change that took place in the Court’s approach to government aid to 
religious institutions.  The Mitchell Court considered an Establishment 
Clause challenge to a federal program that lent educational materials and 
equipment directly to public and private schools, many of which were 
religiously affiliated.76  The enrollment of a participating school 
determined the amount of aid that particular school received.77  In a 
plurality opinion, four Justices applied the Agostini test and found that 
the program passed constitutional muster because, among other things, a 
student’s decision to enroll in a participating religious school amounted 
to a “private choice” and because the program made funds available to 
public and private schools equally.78  The plurality also contended that 
the question of whether the funds were divertible directly to a religious 
organization is immaterial to the Establishment Clause analysis because 
indoctrination by means of a private school diverting such aid could not 
be attributed to the government.79  As such, the Court showed a 
tendency to value the formal neutrality of government action far more 
than the actual effects of the government program when deciding 
whether the program complied with the Establishment Clause. 
Finally, the Court took its most overtly formally neutral position in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.80  Zelman concerned a challenge to an Ohio 
school voucher program that distributed tuition assistance to families in 
need.  Upon receiving aid, the parents of a child had the sole discretion 
to determine where that aid was spent.81  During the 1999–2000 school 
year, eighty-two percent of private schools participating in the program 
were religiously affiliated and ninety-six percent of the students 
participating in the program attended private religious schools.82  Again, 
a plurality of the Court upheld the aid program. 
The Zelman plurality summarized prior precedent and succinctly 
stated that an Establishment Clause challenge cannot defeat “a 
 
 75.  Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).  
 76.  Id. at 801. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 829.  Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment but offered a separate opinion 
which Justice Breyer joined. 
 79.  Id. at 824 (arguing strict reliance on the possibility that aid might be diverted for purposes 
of religious indoctrination as means for striking down a government program would effectively 
exclude “government-provided lecterns, chalk, crayons, pens, paper, and paintbrushes” from the 
classrooms of religious schools). 
 80.  536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 81.  Id. at 646. 
 82.  Id. at 647.  Notably, no public schools opted to participate in the program during the 
1999–2000 school year. 
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government aid program [that] is neutral with respect to religion, and 
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, 
direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own 
genuine and independent private choice.”83  The Ohio voucher program, 
the Court stated, was a program of “true private choice,” and as such, it 
did not violate Establishment Clause principles.84  Thus, even though the 
program had the practical effect of bestowing considerable benefits upon 
religious schools, the Court’s emphasis on formal neutrality proved 
dispositive. 
Having traced the trajectory of the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence in both the endorsement and the aid contexts, an 
analysis of the opinion of the District Court for the Northern District of 
Indiana in Wirtz is appropriate.  As illustrated below, the true tension in 
Wirtz centered upon whether it would be Justice O’Connor’s traditional 
endorsement analysis or the Supreme Court’s recent move toward 
formal neutrality culminating in Zelman that would determine the 
constitutionality of South Bend’s intended transfer.  The Wirtz court 
opted for endorsement. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Factual History of  Wirtz v. City of South Bend 
The City of South Bend, Indiana, developed a comprehensive city 
plan covering a timeline of twenty years, addressing the entire 
geographic area of the city, and stating various policies and goals 
conducive to the city’s success in the first decades of the 21st Century.85  
Plans for economic development, of course, formed an integral facet of 
the plan.  In cultivating economic success over recent years, South Bend 
engaged in a variety of transactions with non-religious private entities, 
secular public schools, and a religious organization.86  In 2006, South 
Bend transferred a building it previously purchased to a locally owned 
business for $100,000.87  Two more transactions followed in 2007.  
First, when the City made a below-market transfer to another locally 
owned business in order to allow that business to expand and, second, 
when the City transferred a parking lot for two dollars to a private entity 
 
 83.  Id. at 652.   
 84.  Id. 
 85.  See generally THE CITY OF SOUTH BEND COMPREHENSIVE PLAN (Nov. 13, 2006), 
http://www.ci.south-bend.in.us/sites/default/files/files/CED_CityPlan.pdf. 
 86.  Wirtz v. City of S. Bend, Ind., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1060 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 87.  Id. at 1061.  
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in order to promote condominium and office development.88  
Throughout 2009 and into 2010, the City either flatly donated or 
transferred land for nominal consideration to local physicians, local 
artists, a regional hospital, a city development commission, and a public 
college.89  Most recently, South Bend transferred land and $3 million in 
combined city and state funds to the Salvation Army, an avowedly 
Christian organization dedicated to spreading the gospel of Christ and 
meeting the needs of the underprivileged.90 
In the midst of these attempts at revitalization, Saint Joseph 
Regional Medical Center, a hospital located in downtown South Bend, 
decided to leave the city and thereby to vacate the twenty-one acres on 
which it stood.91  Early in the 2000s, St. Joseph’s High School (St. 
Joseph’s), a private school overseen by the Catholic diocese, expressed 
interest in the land as a possible site for a $35 million project that would 
result in the creation of a new high school and athletic complex.92  
Adjacent to the land vacated by the medical center stood a Family Dollar 
store, which was in full operation upon a lot that was not listed for sale.  
The owners of that store were approached by St. Joseph’s regarding its 
interest in purchasing the land, but the parties failed to reach an 
agreement for its sale.  In 2007, South Bend sought to induce St. 
Joseph’s to bring its substantial project to the heart of the City as a facet 
of its economic revitalization plan, and as such, the City proposed a 
purchase of the Family Dollar parcel, intending to then transfer the land 
to St. Joseph’s.93 
The South Bend Common Council passed an ordinance authorizing 
the purchase of the Family Dollar parcel for $1.2 million with the intent 
of transferring the land to St. Joseph’s.  The City used funds from its 
economic development income tax fund to purchase the land.94  As 
originally conceived, the transaction began with the City first 
transferring the land to an Indiana non-profit corporation, which would 
then transfer the land to St. Joseph’s subject to the condition that the 
public would retain the rights to certain uses of the football field and 
track for a period of ten years.95  The transfer agreement also addressed 
 
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id. at 1060-61. 
 90.  Id. at 1060. 
 91.  Id. at 1053-54.   
 92.  Id. at 1054. 
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Specifically, for a period of ten years, St. Joseph’s was contractually bound to allow 
certain public uses which included allowing access of community organizations to the athletic 
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concerns regarding the sectarian nature of St. Joseph’s High School and 
expressly stated that “[n]o participation in any religious activity shall be 
required of any participant in any service provided [by St. Joseph’s to 
the public relating to the public’s use of the track and athletic 
facilities].”96 
Intending to use the Family Dollar parcel to build parts of its 
football stadium, track, and a parking lot, St. Joseph’s ultimately 
purchased the Medical Center’s former property and began constructing 
its new high school.97  Prior to completion of the transfer of the Family 
Dollar parcel, however, four taxpayers brought an action to enjoin the 
transfer under the argument that South Bend’s intended action would 
violate both the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution 
and Article 1, sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution.98  Ultimately, 
the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana agreed.99 
B. The Opinion of the District Court for the Northern District of 
Indiana 
On September 7, 2011, the District Court for the Northern District 
of Indiana granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the imminent 
transfer of the Family Dollar parcel from the City of South Bend to St. 
 
facilities, providing summer sports camps for area youth, and coordinating with local youth sports 
organizations to make available the athletic facilities for their use. 
Though tangentially referred to in the District Court’s opinion at times, the specifics of the public 
uses allowed under the original transfer agreement are never set forth in the opinion.  As such, I 
contacted counsel for the City of South Bend and subsequently received the stipulated facts of the 
case.  To my knowledge, the stipulated facts are not available online at this time.  
 96.  This language also is contained in the transfer agreement as represented in the stipulated 
facts of the case, and as stated in the previous note, these facts may not be available to the public 
generally absent the submission of a public records request to the clerk of the District Court for the 
Northern District of Indiana. 
 97.  Wirtz, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  After the District Court granted the preliminary injunction in Wirtz, South Bend sought to 
cure the District Court’s perceived Establishment Clause violation and moved to amend or dissolve 
the injunction by proposing a transfer that would be made via an open bidding system.  South Bend 
intended the transfer to be made pursuant to an Indiana Statute that would allow the City to reject an 
offer from the highest bidder if it could provide an explanation for so doing.  Prospective bidders 
were to be evaluated on their ability to use the property in a way that furthered the City’s economic 
development plan consisting of the construction of St. Joseph’s new high school and its 
accompanying athletic complex.  St. Joseph’s was prepared to pay $345,000 for the parcel under 
this new scheme.  The District Court, however, remained unconvinced that such a transfer did not 
violate the Establishment Clause and again held that the objective, well-informed, reasonable 
observer would view the transfer as the City’s express endorsement of religion.  As such, the court 
denied South Bend’s motion to amend or dissolve the injunction.  See Wirtz, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1051. 
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Joseph’s High School.100  Though neither party considered the Lemon 
test necessary to deciding the case, the District Court disagreed and 
noted the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Lemon in several previous 
decisions.101  As such, the District Court conducted the Lemon analysis, 
focusing almost completely on the effects prong of the test.102 
The District Court proceeded to conduct its analysis of Lemon’s 
effects prong under the guidance of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement 
test.103  In making that decision, the District Court necessarily adhered to 
what it perceived to be the controlling formulation of Lemon under its 
court of appeals, the Seventh Circuit.104  The court noted several cases in 
which the Seventh Circuit relied upon the endorsement analysis to 
decide Establishment Clause disputes.  These cases included an 
evaluation of a display of the Ten Commandments,105 a state statute 
mandating a period of silence in public schools,106 a statue of Christ 
located in a city park,107 and mandatory religious presentations to 
government employees authorized by a county sheriff.108 
Ultimately, the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana 
concluded that the proposed transfer violated the Establishment Clause.  
The District Court stated: 
 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 1057.  
 102.  The court stated that neither the secular purpose nor the entanglement prongs of Lemon 
were at issue in the case.  Specifically, the court noted, “[The Plaintiffs] don’t contest the City’s 
secular purpose to revitalize the East Race area or contend that the proposed transaction will 
excessively entangle a governmental body with a religious institution. This allows the court to focus 
entirely on the second prong, namely, whether the transfer of the Family Dollar parcel will have the 
principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.”  Id. 
 103.  Though the City contended that the endorsement analysis was no longer a valid approach 
to deciding a dispute arising under the effects prong, the District Court disagreed and stated that it 
was not the court’s place to dispose of Supreme Court precedent.  Id. at 1058 (stating “it isn’t the 
role of a district court to decide Supreme Court precedent has been implicitly overruled”). 
 104.  Id. (stating that the endorsement analysis was “alive and quite healthy” in the Seventh 
Circuit).  
 105.  Books v. Elkhart Cnty., Ind., 401 F.3d 857, 867 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that the display 
was constitutional because, among other things, it did not have the principal or primary effect of 
endorsing religion). 
 106.  Sherman ex rel. Sherman v. Koch, 623 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that the primary 
effect of the state statute did not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion).  
 107.  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 
2000) (finding that the location of the statue of Christ violated the establishment clause by creating 
a perception of city endorsement of religion). 
 108.  Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding the 
Establishment Clause was violated when an authority figure invited a Christian organization that 
engaged in religious proselytizing to speak on numerous occasions at mandatory government 
employee meetings).  
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The proposed Family Dollar transaction has the appearance of putting 
adherents and nonadherents on different footing, which would lead an 
objective, well-informed, reasonable observer to think the City is 
endorsing St. Joseph’s High School, the local Catholic community, or 
the Diocese that operates the high school. . . . To the adherents, namely 
the supporters of St. Joseph’s High School and the Diocese, this 
below-market transfer of real estate could be considered an 
endorsement of their undertaking to rebuild and expand the high 
school.  A well-informed and reasonable nonadherent would see the 
below-market transfer as a direct endorsement of a particular 
religion.109 
While the Wirtz Court’s endorsement analysis was the key to its 
holding that the intended transfer was unconstitutional, the court also 
addressed the Supreme Court’s formal neutrality cases in response to an 
argument by the City.  However, these cases, the court reasoned, did not 
secure the constitutionality of South Bend’s intended transfer under the 
Establishment Clause.110  The City argued that, under the neutrality 
cases discussed above, the transfer of the Family Dollar parcel was 
constitutional as but one facet of a program consisting of multiple 
transfers, none of which relied upon the transferee’s religious affiliation 
or lack-thereof.111  The District Court was not persuaded.112  The court 
honed in on the ad hoc nature of the transfer to distinguish this case from 
the program considered in Zelman.113  Particularly, the District Court 
found two problems with the ad hoc transfers.  First, the ultimate 
decision to make a land transfer rested in the hands of independent 
government decision-makers instead of private individuals.114  Second, 
each single transfer lacked specific, neutral criteria to guide the 
government in making the transfer.115  As such, the District Court held 
that the transfer failed to satisfy the Zelman standard because it was not 
part of a neutral program and because the aid intended for St. Joseph’s 
did not reach the school through the private choices of individuals. 
In its analysis, the District Court frequently cited the below-market 
 
 109.  Wirtz v. City of S. Bend, Ind., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1068 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
 110.   Id. at 1067-68.  
 111.  Id. at 1063-64.  
 112.   The court did note that the City had a pattern of development transfers that was neutral 
toward religion butfound that the City’s intent, which the court agreed was secular in nature, was 
largely immaterial because the reasonable observer would view the transaction as a signal of the 
City’s endorsement of the Catholic faith.  Id. at 1068.  
 113.  Id. at 1062-1063. 
 114.  Id. at 1067. 
 115.  Id. at 1067-68. 
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nature of South Bend’s intended transfer.116  The court asserted that this 
below-market transfer would be akin to the City giving an unrestricted 
gift of cash to St. Joseph’s.117  This, the court stated, violated the 
Establishment Clause because such a gift to a pervasively sectarian 
institution may result in religious indoctrination.118  Later in its opinion, 
the court again cited the below-market nature of the transfer as grounds 
for establishing that the Establishment Clause would be violated because 
the City, despite the conditions allowing for public use of the property, 
would be giving more than it was getting.  As such, the court found that 
“a well-informed and reasonable nonadherent would see the . . . transfer 
as a direct endorsement of a particular religion.”119  Given the frequency 
of the court’s citation to the below-market nature of the transfer, this 
trait of the proposed agreement was ostensibly of singular importance to 
the court’s analysis.  As stated above, enjoining economic development 
land transfers to religious institutions due to their below-market nature 
will preclude such institutions from receiving many, if not most, 
transfers that would benefit a city’s plan for economic revitalization.  As 
Part III explains, such a result is not mandated by the Constitution and is 
not desirable from a policy perspective. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Lower Court Precedent Supports the Constitutionality of Public 
Land Transfers to Religious Institutions 
At the outset, it is necessary to note that economic development 
land transfers to religious institutions do not fit comfortably within any 
single Establishment Clause analysis proffered by the Supreme Court, 
and looking to the decisions of the circuit and district courts also fails to 
provide much in the way of guidance.  Surprisingly, few courts have 
decided cases concerning the constitutionality of land transfers to 
religious institutions, especially in the economic development context.  
Indeed, the Wirtz court noted that neither the parties nor the court found 
 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 1065.  The City, while recognizing the below-market nature of the transfer, 
implored the court to consider the non-economic consideration that would benefit South Bend, 
namely the choice of St. Joseph’s to bring its $35 million project downtown.  Without the 
inducement of the transfer of the Family Dollar parcel, the City argued that a ghostly twenty-one 
acre vacancy would have marred property at the heart of the city.  Id. at 1065. 
 119.  Id. at 1068. 
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any case law directly on point.120  However, this section of the Note 
illustrates that lower courts confronting similar issues tend to rule that 
public transfers to religious institutions do not violate the Establishment 
Clause. 
Perhaps the most relevant of these cases is Southside Fair Housing 
Committee v. City of New York.121  In Southside, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals considered the question of whether the sale of urban 
renewal property to a Hasidic community for purposes of developing, 
among other things, a 6,000-seat synagogue violated the Establishment 
Clause.122  The Second Circuit ruled in favor of the transfer, basing its 
decision in part on the fact that the public in general would benefit from 
the development of depressed land.123  Moreover, the Second Circuit 
found that the primary effect of the transfer to the Hasidic community in 
Southside was not to advance religion but to revive a blighted area of the 
city.124  Thus, the transfer survived Establishment Clause scrutiny. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reached a similar result in In Re 
Condemnation by the Minneapolis Community Development Agency.125  
The dispute in that case arose after the Minneapolis Community 
Development Agency filed a petition to condemn property as part of a 
program to develop a city block in downtown Minneapolis.126  The 
planned restoration project had the effect of conferring a benefit on the 
local Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), and as such, the 
condemnation was challenged under the Establishment Clause.127  After 
applying the Lemon test, the court held that the condemnation was 
 
 120.  Id. at 1061.   
 121.  The District Court in Wirtz considered this case but found that it was distinguishable from 
South Bend’s intended transfer.  Specifically, the court found the fact that the land in Southside was 
sold for market value to be critical in making the distinction between the two cases.  Since the 
transfer in Wirtz was to occur at below-market levels, the court reasoned that Southside was of very 
limited applicability.  Id. at 1061.  
The Wirtz court was, however, selective in its treatment of Southside.  First, the Second Circuit 
considered the sale price of the land only in terms of deciding whether the sale violated the effects 
prong of Lemon by impermissibly subsidizing the primary religious mission of the Hasidic 
community.  Southside Fair Hous. Comm. v. City of New York, 928 F. 2d 1336, 1348 (2d Cir. 
1991).  The transfer of the Family Dollar parcel in Wirtz for purposes of building a football field and 
track could hardly be said to amount to a subsidy of the primary religious mission of the Catholic 
faith.  Second and more importantly, the District Court did not even mention the Second Circuit’s 
endorsement analysis.  That portion of the Southside opinion is discussed below. 
 122.  Southside, 928 F.2d at 1356. 
 123.  Id. at 1347.   
 124.  Id. at 1348-51. 
 125.  439 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 1989). 
 126.  Id. at 709.  
 127.  Id. 
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constitutional because, among other things, the comprehensive plan did 
not “fund a specifically religious activity.”128  Moreover, in recognizing 
that the YMCA would enjoy incidental benefits stemming from the 
condemnation, the court stated: “Of course, there are advantages to the 
YMCA . . . just as there are advantages to the project in having a health 
and recreational center as an anchor.  But these indirect considerations 
do not impose upon the neutrality required by the establishment 
clause.”129 
One commentator notes that land transfers to religious institutions 
are also frequently upheld in eminent domain cases where the challenger 
asserts that transferring property to religious entities does not amount to 
a constitutional “public use.”130  Specifically, courts upholding such 
transfers tend to tout the public benefits that flow from religious 
organizations to local communities.131  These benefits conferred upon 
the public make religious institutions important components of their 
respective communities, and as such, courts often find the public 
purpose requirement of eminent domain takings satisfied.132  Such public 
benefits would also undoubtedly flow from economic development land 
transfers to religious institutions whose very purpose is to stimulate the 
local economy as a whole.  As such, the Wirtz court’s contention that the 
public gets less than it gives when a religious institution receives a 
below-market transfer appears to be refuted, at least in some factual 
scenarios. 
These cases serve to reinforce the assertion above that the decision 
in Wirtz was neither necessary nor desirable.  Courts have found 
economic development transfers to religious institutions capable of 
satisfying the Lemon test, and in the eminent domain cases, courts did 
 
 128.  Id. at 713. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Nicholas William Haddad, Note, Public Use or Private Benefit? The Post-Kelo 
Intersection of Religious Land Use and the Public Use Doctrine, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105, 1121-
23 (2006).   
 131.  Id. at 1125.  Specifically, Haddad names hospitals operated by religious organizations, 
private religious schools, drug rehabilitation centers, universities, homeless shelters, day care 
centers, and orphanages as examples of the public benefits conferred upon communities by religious 
institutions.  Id.  
 132.  Id. at 1125-27.  Haddad also notes that the analysis of the “public purpose” requirement 
in eminent domain cases is strikingly similar to the analysis in which courts engage when deciding 
whether the “secular purpose” prong of the Lemon test has been satisfied in Establishment Clause 
cases.  Id. at 1120.  As such, though the eminent domain cases do not necessarily speak to the 
validity of economic development land transfers under the Establishment Clause, the fact that courts 
in each type of case consistently uphold such transfers is at least evidence that the public is 
receiving as much as it is giving in these transactions. 
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not hesitate to point to the wide range of benefits that often stem from 
land transfer transactions between the government and religious 
organizations.  Ostensibly, South Bend’s transfer to St. Joseph’s would 
also have provided benefits to the City, namely furthering South Bend’s 
comprehensive development plan by preventing a large tract of land in 
the heart of the City from remaining vacant and by providing access to 
recreational facilities to the community.  Of course, the mere existence 
of incidental benefits of a transaction is insufficient to cure a 
constitutional problem.  Accordingly, an Establishment Clause violation 
would rightly preclude South Bend’s intended transfer.  However, the 
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana erred by applying the 
endorsement test in this context and erred by ruling that the transfer 
would breach the barrier separating church and state. 
B. The Endorsement Test Fails to Provide an Adequate Standard to 
Determine the Constitutionality of Economic Development Land 
Transfers to Religious Institutions 
Despite the Wirtz-court’s heavy reliance upon it, Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement test is ill-suited to resolve the issues that arise 
when the government decides to transfer land to a religious institution as 
a facet of an economic development plan.  The test is certainly useful in 
some contexts.  However, it is limited in value when applied to complex 
factual scenarios where determining what the reasonable observer would 
perceive necessarily relies on first making several assumptions regarding 
the observer’s knowledge of those things that cannot be seen by the 
naked eye. 
One of the primary problems with applying the endorsement test to 
situations involving economic development land transfers is defining 
just who the “reasonable observer” is, what the reasonable observer 
should know, and when he or she should know it.  Indeed, the failure of 
the endorsement test’s ability to solve establishment disputes in the land 
transfer context is illustrated plainly by the Wirtz court’s own struggle to 
decide what the reasonable observer should and should not know.133  In 
Wirtz, after noting that the “reasonable observer” is “well-informed,” the 
Court stated that if the proper time to judge the perception of the 
reasonable observer is at the time the City decided to transfer the Family 
Dollar parcel, the reasonable observer might need to be omniscient.  As 
such, the Court asserted: 
 
 133.  Wirtz v. City of S. Bend, Ind., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1068 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
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[R]ather than dwell[ing] on what the objective and informed 
reasonable person knew and when she knew it, the court assumes that 
the objective and informed reasonable person knows that the City’s 
acquisition and contemplated transfer of the Family Dollar parcel is a 
follow-up to representations made to induce St. Joseph’s High School 
to develop the property the Medical Center was vacating.134 
The “who, what, and when” questions raised in the previous 
paragraph are simply—or at least more simply—answered in the types 
of cases for which the endorsement analysis is typically applied and for 
which the endorsement analysis should be reserved.  It is relatively easy 
to gauge the reasonable observer’s perception of and reaction to the 
presence of a cross on public land, a statue of Christ in a public park, the 
placement of the Ten Commandments in a courthouse, a classroom of 
children in a public school reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, or those 
same children engaged in a moment of silence and prayer.135  It is 
significantly more difficult to answer those questions in the context of a 
city’s transfer of land to a religious organization.  The Second Circuit in 
Southside found the endorsement test unhelpful for just this reason and 
asserted that cases involving land transfers are clearly distinguishable 
from those involving religious symbols on public land.136  In dismissing 
the argument that the transfer in Southside violated the Establishment 
Clause, the Second Circuit stated, “[a] reasonable observer passing a 
synagogue or church built on urban renewal land would have no way of 
associating that institution with the government.”137  Similarly, a 
reasonable observer passing an athletic complex adjacent to a Catholic 
high school would not find the imprimatur of the government stamped 
upon it. 
Many commentators have seized upon the endorsement test’s 
susceptibility to the danger of judges injecting their own subjective 
assessments when determining what the hypothetical reasonable 
observer would perceive as he or she analyzed a government practice.138  
In a particularly scathing review of this trait of the endorsement test, 
Steven D. Smith argued: 
[A] purely fictitious character will perceive precisely as much, and 
only as much, as its author wants it to perceive; and there is no 
empirical touchstone or outside referent upon which a critic could rely 
 
 134.  Id. at 1067. 
 135.  See generally supra Part I.B. 
 136.  Southside Fair Hous. Comm. v. City of New York, 928 F. 2d 1336, 1348 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See, e.g., Cole, supra note 44, at 584.  
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to show that the author was wrong. The most that could be said in a 
given case is that the “objective observer’s” perceptions are 
remarkably unlike those of most real human beings.139 
The District Court for the Northern District of Indiana in Wirtz fell 
into this trap of the endorsement analysis.  Not only was the District 
Court forced to contend with an inherent flaw in the test, but the absence 
of a clear place in time for which the reasonable observer could perceive 
South Bend’s transfer rendered application of that test exceedingly more 
difficult and uncertain.  Whether armed with good intentions or not, the 
Wirtz court’s arbitrary assignment of knowledge to the fictitious 
observer it created sapped the endorsement test of any value and stands 
as a testament to the poverty of the test’s application in this context. 
Moreover, the District Court failed to avoid the omniscience 
problem that it recognized.  If the court assumes that the reasonable 
person knows the contemplated transfer emerged from private 
negotiations to develop the vacated property, from where does the court 
assume that knowledge is derived?  Further still, to come to the court’s 
conclusion that the reasonable observer would find that South Bend 
endorsed Catholicism via the transfer, the reasonable observer ostensibly 
would have to have knowledge of the below-market nature of the 
transfer as well as knowledge that the public use of the facilities would 
not extend into perpetuity.  Even if the reasonable person knew all of 
this, do we also assume that he or she would be informed of the fact that 
no secular entities expressed interest in developing the land?  Would it 
also be assumed that this observer knows that economic development 
supplied South Bend’s primary motive in initiating the transfer or that 
the City previously transferred several pieces of property to nonsectarian 
entities as a part of the same development initiative?140 
By the time the court finishes making its assumptions, the 
reasonable observer is but an avatar of the court armed with an intimate 
personal knowledge of the facts and driven by the underlying values of 
the judge who authors the opinion.  The “reasonable observer” in the 
land transfer context will therefore perceive endorsement only when the 
court believes endorsement exists.141 
The District Court in Wirtz also overvalued the relevance of its 
appellate court’s endorsement test jurisprudence.  Even though the Wirtz 
court was quick to note that the endorsement test is “quite healthy” in 
 
 139.  See Smith, supra note 44, at 292-93. 
 140.  See generally supra Part II.A. 
 141.  See Smith, supra note 44, at 293. 
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the Seventh Circuit,142 a cursory analysis of the cases cited for this 
proposition reveals that the Wirtz court’s application of the endorsement 
test was novel and not compelled by Seventh Circuit decisions.  
Consistent with a proper application of the endorsement analysis, the 
Seventh Circuit previously used the endorsement standard to evaluate 
the constitutionality of government actions which blatantly implicated 
religion, namely those factual scenarios where the reasonable observer 
could validly judge whether the government appeared to favor 
religion.143  However, the Seventh Circuit does not apply the 
endorsement test in all scenarios and has recently decided Establishment 
Clause cases without even mentioning Lemon.144  In Badger Catholic, 
Inc. v. Walsh,145 the Seventh Circuit considered whether a state 
university’s reimbursement of expenses of speakers invited to campus 
by a religious organization through a program equally available to 
secular speakers violated the Establishment Clause.146  The Seventh 
Circuit held that paying a religious speaker’s expenses did not violate 
the Establishment Clause because such payment was distributed from “a 
neutral program justified by the program’s secular benefits . . . even if 
the religious speaker uses some of the money for prayer or sectarian 
instruction.”147  As such, the Seventh Circuit relied upon the formal 
neutrality of the program at issue in Badger Catholic to uphold it, not 
upon whether a reasonable person would perceive endorsement.148 
Simply stated, the endorsement test is an unsatisfactory standard for 
deciding Establishment Clause disputes concerning economic 
development land transfers.  The endorsement analysis necessarily relies 
upon the perceptions of the well-informed, reasonable observer.  
However, when the very task of determining who the reasonable 
observer is and what he or she knows results in nothing less than the 
court assuming the reasonable observer’s role, the endorsement test is 
rendered ineffective.  Reliance on the endorsement analysis in this 
context will inevitably produce jurisprudence fraught with inconsistency 
 
 142.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text.  
 143.  See supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text. 
 144.  See Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2010).   
 145.  620 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 146.  Id. at 778.   
 147.  Id.  Notably, the Seventh Circuit cited Zelman as a “good example” of the validity of this 
reasoning.  Id. 
 148.  The District Court in Wirtz apparently realized that the Lemon test was not appropriate 
for determining the outcome of every case but cited Badger Catholic only for the proposition that 
“[t]he court of appeals hasn’t yet articulated a standard governing when Lemon needn’t be applied.”  
Wirtz v. City of S. Bend, Ind., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1058 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
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and arbitrary decision-making.  Even the creator of the endorsement test 
and its greatest advocate did not recommend the test as a “grand unified 
theory” to be applied in every Establishment Clause case.149 
The District Court for the Northern District of Indiana failed to 
recognize the limits of the endorsement test.  Therefore, the District 
Court also erred in deciding Wirtz.  Yet, this does not necessarily mean 
that South Bend’s intended transfer was constitutional.  Even though the 
endorsement test is not suited to decide the issue, the City’s transfer of 
the Family Dollar parcel to St. Joseph’s may have been unconstitutional 
upon other grounds.  It is the contention of this Note, however, that the 
intended transfer, when viewed under a principle of formal neutrality, 
passes constitutional muster. 
C. Cases Concerning the Constitutionality of Economic Development 
Transfers to Religious Institutions Should Be Guided by Reliance 
upon Formal Neutrality 
If economic development land transfers to religious institutions fall 
outside the scope of the endorsement test, a standard must be ascertained 
which can adequately decide disputes arising in this context.  The 
approach of formal neutrality appears well-suited for the task.  
Undoubtedly, formal neutrality doctrine gained traction with the 
Supreme Court in recent Establishment Clause decisions, if only in the 
aid context.150  More importantly, the formal neutrality approach can 
provide a standard that is less susceptible to the predilections of the 
court, more likely to produce consistent results, and still sufficient to 
ensure that government acts without an impermissible religious motive.  
Furthermore, the aspects of formal neutrality criticized by commentators 
in the aid context, as discussed below, are diminished in the land transfer 
context. 
Prior to discussing what it is about formal neutrality, as formulated 
in the aid context, that translates well to evaluating the constitutionality 
of religious land transfers, it is worth considering the facets of the 
Zelman standard that are not so easily converted.  It is immediately clear 
that the largest hurdle presented to applying formal neutrality to the 
economic development land transfer context is the Supreme Court’s 
 
 149.  See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 717-719 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 150.  See supra Part II.A & B.  See also Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious 
Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 
10 (2000) (stating that “formal neutrality has become the dominant theme under both the Free 
Exercise and the Establishment Clauses”). 
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reliance on the presence of “true private choice” to establish the 
neutrality of the government programs at issue in the aid cases.151  
Indeed, in dismissing South Bend’s argument that Zelman should guide 
the decision in Wirtz, the District Court stated, “[t]oday’s case isn’t 
Zelman.  There is no independent decision maker.”152 
The second problem of applying the Zelman standard to the 
economic development transfer context was also realized by the District 
Court in Wirtz.  Zelman relied on the fact that a single “program” applied 
equally to sectarian and non-sectarian schools could justly be declared 
“neutral.”  In contrast, the District Court in Wirtz noted that South Bend 
engaged in making ad hoc transfers, each involving unique 
circumstances, unique city action, and requiring separate negotiations.153  
At best, the District Court asserted, the City had a pattern of 
development that was neutral with respect to religion.154  As such, 
because South Bend’s development plan did not explicitly apply 
religion-neutral criteria to the evaluation of every transfer, the District 
Court determined that the City’s case was distinguishable from the 
Supreme Court’s aid cases.155 
In one important sense, the District Court correctly found that the 
formal neutrality analysis in Zelman was inapplicable to the facts in 
Wirtz.  After all, the City of South Bend decided to transfer the Family 
Dollar parcel absent any true private control, and the City’s history of 
development transfers were indeed ad hoc in nature and not part of a 
narrowly and specifically defined program.  Quite simply, a direct 
application of the Supreme Court’s standard in Zelman contributes little 
to deciding Establishment Clause issues in the economic development 
land transfer context. 
However, it would be absurd to believe that the exact standard 
applied by the Supreme Court in the aid context would be applicable to 
all Establishment Clause disputes.  The contention of this Note is that 
formal neutrality, as described by Kurland above,156 should be the 
 
 151.  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (stating that the Supreme 
Court has never found a program of true private choice to offend the Establishment Clause).   
 152.  Wirtz, 813 F. Supp. 2d. at 1062. 
 153.  Id. at 1067. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 
(1961).  Kurland advanced formal neutrality as a remedy to the inconsistency of the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but it is important to note that Kurland did not believe 
formal neutrality should be applied mechanically to solve the Establishment Clause problems 
coming before the Court.  Kurland characterized the principle of formal neutrality as merely “a 
starting point.”  Id.  Because the principle of formal neutrality should only be the starting point of 
31
Doringo: Revival Toward a Formal Neutrality
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
VOL. 46, NO. 3 - ARTICLE 5 - DORINGO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2013  2:59 PM 
794 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:763 
guiding principle in determining the constitutionality of economic 
development land transfers to religious institutions.  To say this is not to 
say that the Zelman standard should directly apply to all Establishment 
Clause cases.  The Zelman standard is but the principle of formal 
neutrality embodied in the aid context as expressed by the Supreme 
Court; it is not formal neutrality per se.  Therefore, Zelman and the other 
formal neutrality cases mentioned above should be understood as 
evidence of the Supreme Court’s shift from a focus on effects and 
perceptions to a focus on the principle that government decisions which 
do not “utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction” do not 
violate the Establishment Clause.157 
Broadening the application of formal neutrality by applying it to the 
religious land transfer context arguably makes more sense than applying 
it to government aid cases, where the principle is now seemingly 
dispositive.  Criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Zelman, Steven 
Gey argued that formal neutrality in aid cases is but a pretext for 
condoning the preferential funneling of substantial amounts of funding 
to religious institutions.158  Furthermore, Gey argues that formal 
neutrality in the aid context amounts to government’s use of “its 
coercive taxing authority to force one person to support another person’s 
faith.”159  Economic development transfers to religious institutions do 
not implicate the same concerns due to the very nature of the transaction.  
Religious institutions receive development transfers precisely because 
they will confer a larger benefit upon the community.  As such, there is 
less concern of such a transfer being a mere pretext, especially in the 
larger scheme of a comprehensive secular plan; there is also less cause 
for arguing that such transfers support another individual’s faith with 
taxpayer money since the transfers do not directly fund any form of 
religious indoctrination.160 
Moreover, a formal neutrality analysis which tends to validate land 
transfers to religious institutions as part of a comprehensive plan makes 
 
Establishment Clause analysis in the economic development land transfer context, this Note does 
not propose that the Zelman standard of formal neutrality can be applied directly to determine the 
constitutionality of transfers to religious institutions.  Rather, Part III.D of the Note proposes a new 
standard to guide courts, built upon a foundation of formal neutrality.   
 157.  Id. 
 158.  See Gey, supra note 1, at 738. 
 159.  Id. at 739. 
 160.  Modern Supreme Court precedent also largely dismisses arguments based on concerns of 
government aid to religious institutions being diverted to the indoctrination of individuals because 
such indoctrination cannot reasonably be attributed to the government.  See supra note 79 and 
accompanying text. 
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policy sense.  Religious institutions are important components of the 
communities that benefit from their local presence.161  Under the Wirtz 
court’s analysis, religious institutions would rarely, if ever, be eligible 
for a below-market economic development transfer.  Indeed, in faulting 
the City’s intended transfer for not being properly evaluated under 
secular criteria, the District Court stated, “[m]ost importantly, each 
transaction requires separate legislative approval, which converts even 
the most neutrally intentioned, long-range development plan into a series 
of individual actions by the currently-empowered legislators.”162  Land 
transfers are, of necessity, ad hoc in nature and the execution of a 
comprehensive development plan will, as it did in Wirtz, take years to 
perfect.  To hold that each transaction is essentially void because of 
government control over the ultimate approval, despite overwhelming 
evidence of the government’s secular intent, is illogical and would likely 
preclude any transfer from benefiting both religious institutions and their 
surrounding communities. 
D. A Recommended Standard and Wirtz Analysis 
The novel standard recommended by this Note for evaluating 
economic development transfers to religious institutions is simple: 
courts should find no Establishment Clause violation when (1) a transfer 
is a single transaction in the context of a secular comprehensive 
development plan; (2) the relevant community will derive a significant 
discernible benefit, whether monetary or otherwise, from the transfer; 
and (3) there is no actual evidence that government’s primary goal was 
to favor religion through the transfer. 
This standard should effectively preserve the major premise of 
Kurland’s principle of formal neutrality163—that is, that religion may not 
form the basis for government action or inaction.  The first two elements 
of the proposed standard serve to ensure that a preference for religion is 
not the motivating factor behind a transfer.  The third element seeks to 
prevent end runs around the Establishment Clause where a transfer 
occurs in the context of a comprehensive plan and is beneficial to the 
community, but where there nonetheless exists evidence tending to 
prove that government initiated the transfer primarily to benefit religion 
exists nonetheless. 
The Wirtz transaction would surely pass constitutional muster under 
 
 161.  See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 162.  Wirtz v. City of S. Bend, Ind., 813 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1067 (N.D. Ind. 2011).   
 163.  See Kurland, supra note 156, at 96. 
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this standard.  First, South Bend’s intended transfer was one in a series 
of transfers made under a secular comprehensive plan that conferred 
benefits upon numerous religiously neutral entities. Second, bringing a 
$35 million construction project to downtown South Bend certainly 
constituted a “significant discernible benefit” to the relevant community.  
Lastly, South Bend clearly intended to further its development plan and 
not to benefit religion, a fact with which the District Court agreed.164 
The proposed standard of this Note seeks to provide a framework 
with which future courts may effectively resolve Establishment Clause 
challenges to economic development land transfers.  The Wirtz decision 
presents a case study illustrating the near total failure of modern 
Supreme Court precedent to provide an adequate structure to decide 
these land transfer problems.  Indeed, both the endorsement test and a 
direct application of the Court’s Zelman standard are of little value in 
this context.  Courts will, however, inevitably confront this issue again, 
and the standard outlined above offers an avenue for resolution that will 
result in decisions that respect the separation requirements of the 
Establishment Clause and avoid the broad and unnecessary preclusion of 
land transfers that benefit local communities and the institutions that 
receive them. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The decision in Wirtz is now unlikely to have much of a lasting 
impact on the whole of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  The 
Seventh Circuit recently dismissed the City of South Bend’s appeal as 
moot and untimely.165  Ultimately, the City moved the District Court to 
modify the preliminary injunction to allow the sale of the land to the 
highest bidder so that St. Joseph’s would be fully prepared to begin the 
new school year.166  The injunction was modified accordingly, and St. 
Joseph’s received the parcel after entering the highest bid.167  Thus, the 
short saga of Wirtz came to an end.  Yet, the District Court’s decision in 
Wirtz still serves to illuminate the shortcomings of the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and to compel discussion of just 
how to approach economic development land transfers to religious 
 
 164.  The Wirtz court characterized South Bend’s comprehensive plan as “nonsectarian” and 
stated, “The City’s actual intent is likely to endorse the high school’s construction project, not the 
high school itself or the religion with which the high school is affiliated . . . .” Wirtz, 813 F. Supp. 
2d at 1068. 
 165.  Wirtz v. City of S. Bend, 669 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 166.  Id. at 861. 
 167.  Id. 
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institutions. 
As of this date, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence evokes harsh criticism from commentators and fails to 
offer the guidance lower courts and legislatures seek from the High 
Court.168  Not only do the failings of the Supreme Court make it 
exceedingly difficult for the Nation’s lower courts to rule upon 
Establishment issues, but more importantly, the doctrinal mess handed 
down to those lower courts, as Justice Thomas once noted, “raises the 
further concern that either in appearance or in fact, adjudication of 
Establishment Clause challenges turns on judicial predilections.”169  
Giving credence to these criticisms, Wirtz highlights the dangers of a 
body of precedent that offers little in the way of definitive guidance to 
the lower courts.  At best, the opinion of the District Court for the 
Northern District of Indiana represents the erroneous application of the 
endorsement test to a situation for which it was wholly unsuited.  At 
worst, the opinion represents, as Justice Thomas feared, a judge standing 
in the place of the reasonable observer and ruling on a dispute on the 
basis of his closely held personal beliefs. 
While the Supreme Court would do well to offer a more definitive 
standard by which to decide Establishment Clause cases, courts and 
practitioners are, at least for now, forced to make the best of what they 
have.  As such, the constitutionality of economic development land 
transfers to religious institutions must necessarily be decided within the 
confines of the Court’s modern precedent.  This can be accomplished by 
looking to the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence in aid cases for a 
guiding principle of formal neutrality.  Therefore, if it can be shown that 
a government transfer was initiated absent intent to benefit or burden 
religion, such a transfer should be able to move forward without 
violating the Establishment Clause.  The proposed standard offered by 
this Note, should a court choose to adopt it, embraces formal neutrality 
and provides an avenue for resolution of land transfer disputes that 
respects the Establishment Clause and avoids imposing unfair burdens 
on religious institutions and municipalities seeking to revitalize the local 
economy.  If, on the other hand, courts choose to follow a similar path to 
that charted by the District Court in Wirtz, inconsistency and arbitrary 
 
 168.  See Gey, supra note 1, at 726.  Gey states, “It is by now axiomatic that the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is a mess—both hopelessly confused and deeply 
contradictory.”  See also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 861 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (characterizing Establishment Clause jurisprudence as being in a 
state of “hopeless disarray”). 
 169.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 697 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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decision-making will continue to plague Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, and communities will be deprived of the benefits realized 
by effective development planning. 
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